Income Wealth, and Socialization in Argentina by Daniel Lederman




The data used in this study provides individual-level information about the
population’s participation in social organizations and its willingness to trust
members of their community. Argentina’s participation rate is close to 20%. The
country’s trust rate depends on the question used to measure interpersonal trust.
The more reasonable estimate puts the percentage of the population that trusts
non-family members at 33%. The determinants of the probability of participation
are age, household income, rural communities, and the individual’s trust itself.
The determinants of trust are age, household wealth, participation itself, and the
community or provincial unemployment rates and income inequality.
JEL:  N3, O1, Z0
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1. INTRODUCTION
The number of articles and books on social capital has exploded in recent
years. Robert Putnam’s seminal work on social participation in the United States
was finally published in 2000, but this work and his now famous work on Italian
civic engagement are cited frequently (see Putnam 2000 and 1993). Coleman’s
(1990, chapter 12) definition of social capital is now a staple for rational choice
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social scientists. Economists have jumped on the bandwagon by studying the
effects of “social capital” on various economic and social phenomena, including
economic growth across countries (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 1998),
village incomes in an African country (Narayan and Pritchet 1999), violent crime
rates across countries (Lederman et al. 2001), and financial development within
Italy (Guiso et al. 2000).1  Most studies use measures of “interpersonal trust” and
“participation in social organizations” as proxies for “social capital.”
Instead of looking at the effects of social capital on economic and social
outcomes, this study attempts to identify the empirical determinants of social
participation and interpersonal trust in Argentina, with a special emphasis on the
role of income and wealth. The survey data used in this paper was collected by the
World Bank. The survey was applied to a national and regionally (in six geographic
regions) representative sample of Argentine households. The sample was also
representative of rural and urban communities. The number of responding
households totaled 2235. The survey was implemented during May-June 2000.
Knack and Keefer (1997) contributed to this line of inquiry by estimating
correlations between aggregate (national) measures of social capital and various
institutional and economic variables. Political scientists have also contributed to
this line of research using individual-level data. Brehm and Rahn (1997)
demonstrated, using individual-level data from the U.S., that confidence in public
institutions, civic engagement and interpersonal trust are interrelated. More recent
contributions to the economics literature on the determinants of social capital in
the U.S. are DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998), Glaeser et al. (1999), and Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000 and 1999). There are very few studies of the determinants of social
capital in developing countries.2
The first econometric models presented in this paper are simple Probit
estimates. Subsequently, the results from SUR estimates (which control for the
simultaneous determination of participation and trust at the individual level) and
two-stage Probit estimates are also discussed. The main determinants of the
probability of participation in Argentina are age, age squared, household income
(and perhaps income squared), rural communities (perhaps due to lower
probabilities of migration among rural residents, since most migrants live in urban
centers), perhaps community or provincial unemployment rates, and the individual’s
trust itself. In contrast, the main determinants of trust are age and age squared, but
with the opposite signs to those exhibited by probability of participation, household
wealth (but not its squared term nor household income), participation itself (as
demonstrated by the SUR Probit results concerning the cross-correlation between
the two social capital models), and especially the community or provincial
1Although most analysts find benign effects from social capital, there are a few skeptical views.
Some argue that social capital is not a substitute for good governance by the state (Bowles
1999) and that not all forms of social capital, which benefit some groups at the expense of
others, are necessarily benign (see Rubio 1997; Durlauf 1999; Portes and Landolt 2000; Lederman
et al. 2001).
2Narayan and Pritchett (1999) studied the effect of social capital on incomes across villages in
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unemployment rates and income inequality. These results are consistent with the
predictions of a simple economic model of the determinants of social capital, where
participation captures the “ flow” of social capital, while trust is the stock of social
capital.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 very briefly revisits
concepts and measurement issues related to “social capital” by focusing on
interpersonal “trust” and participation in social organizations. Section 3 describes
the survey questions used to measure these two types of social capital and presents
the Argentine rates of participation and trust revealed by the data. Some space is
dedicated to a comparison of three different aggregate measures of “trust,” which
differ by the type of survey question used to construct each variable. Section  4
presents a very simple economic model of social capital formation at the individual
level, which serves as the guide for the specification of the econometric models.
Section 5 discusses the estimation strategy, including two complications regarding
the potentially simultaneous determination of the probability of participation and
trust, as well as the potential endogeneity of some key explanatory variables.
Section 6 discusses the basic Probit results, while Section 7 presents the results
from SUR Probit regressions and TS-Probit regressions. Section 8 summarizes the
findings and policy recommendations.
2. CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital has been broadly defined as the set of rules, norms, obligations,
reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society’s
institutional arrangements, which enable members to achieve their individual and
community objectives (Coleman 1990; Narayan 1997).  According to Portes and
Landolt (2000, 532) “the definition of social capital as the ability to secure resources
by virtue of membership in social networks or larger social structures represents
the most widely accepted definition of the term today.” Nevertheless, social capi-
tal is not a homogeneous concept but comprises various social elements that
promote individual and collective action.  It follows from this complexity that
measuring social capital is problematic.  Nevertheless, researchers have used —
with varying degrees of success— indicators of social capital based on people’s
participation in social organizations and the sense of trust among community
members.
For economists, it is useful to draw analogies between physical and human
capital and social capital. Coleman (1990, 304-305) put it in the following terms:
“Just as physical capital is created by making changes in materials so as to
form tools that facilitate production, human capital is created by changing persons
so as to give them skills and capabilities… Social capital, in turn, is created when
the relations among persons change in ways that facilitate [collective] action…
The function identified by the concept ‘social capital’ is the value of those aspects
of social structure to actors, as resources that can be used… to realize their
interests.”6 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
But this description of social capital does not establish the reasons why
social interactions can produce useful resources for individuals. Coleman’s
argument is that social interactions, especially repeated interactions, produce
obligations and expectations among individuals (Coleman 1990, 306). In the words
of Brehm and Rahn (1997, 1001-1002), “The more that citizens participate in their
communities, the more that they learn to trust others; the greater the trust citizens
hold for others, the more likely they are to participate.”
3. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN ARGENTINA
A. Survey questions on trust
Until recently, most research focused on aggregate outcomes of social
capital, such as overall participation rates in social organizations (see Putnam
2000). In the United States, the workhorse for most empirical studies of social
capital are the General Social Surveys (GSS), which ask individuals the following
relevant questions: (1) “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (2) The GSS
questionnaire includes questions regarding the respondents’ membership in
organizations such as political groups, religious organizations, unions, school
associations, etc. Another survey that has been tested internationally is the World
Values Surveys (WVS), sponsored by the University of Michigan in several
countries around the globe, especially in industrialized countries and East
and Central Europe. The relevant questions in the WVS are virtually identical to
the GSS.
This approach has been questioned recently. Experimental evidence
provided by Glaeser et al. (1999) shows that the question on interpersonal trust is
not a good predictor of whether an individual will actually trust a stranger. The
answers to this question seem to be more closely related to the respondent’s
perception of his or her own trustworthiness, thus producing a mis-identification
problem. Glaeser and his co-authors warn their readers about aggregation problems
when using the individual-level responses to the general trust question. The concern
is that the sum of positive responses on trustworthiness may not be a good
aggregate approximation to the stock of social capital in a community, because
trusting untrustworthy individuals may hurt naïve trustworthy individuals. The
aggregate stock of social capital of a community should consider both positive
and negative externalities that are difficult to ascertain and measure. At this time,
there are no studies that provide methods for resolving this issue. Hence we opted
to use different questions about interpersonal trust in an attempt to identify trust
rather than trustworthiness. When aggregating the responses we simply added
the positive responses and divided by the sample size to derive the trust rate, thus
ignoring externalities. Some of the econometric results presented below seem to
show that one of the questions used in the survey to some extent resolves the mis-
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The quantitative analysis to be presented below relies on three questions
on trust. The first one (Trust I) is a hypothetical: “If you had to leave suddenly,
whom could you trust to take care of delicate matters, such as your home, children
or a dependent adult?” The respondent is presented with a set of options that
includes family members. A respondent was considered to trust others if he or she
answered that they could rely on someone other than a family member. The second
(Trust II) question is similar to the GSS-WVS question: “The majority of people in
this community are basically honest and you can trust them.” Respondents were
considered to trust others if they were in agreement or strongly agreed with the
statement. The third question (Trust III) is similar the second one in its general
phrasing, but actually asked about distrust: “Today you can’t trust anybody.”
Those who did not agree with this statement were considered to trust others. Note
that the latter two questions are more likely to suffer from the mis-identification
problem highlighted by Glaeser et al. (1999) due to the general and ambiguous
phrasing of the statements.
B. “Trust” rates by survey question
Table 1 shows Argentina’s “trust rates”, which differ by the survey question
used to identify individuals with interpersonal trust. The percentage of respondents
that answered in the affirmative to the first, hypothetical trust question (Trust I)
was 33.1%. The corresponding percentages derived from the more general trust
questions (Trust II and III) are almost twice the first one, reaching 66.8 and 57.7%,
respectively. Hence the question used produces dramatically different results. As
will be seen later, there are also significant differences in terms of the predictions
about individual social participation produced by these three different indicators
of community trust.
TABLE 1
TRUST IN ARGENTINA BY TYPES OF TRUST QUESTION
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data compiled by Sofres-Ibope, Argentina. See
text for definitions.
The regional trust rates show that the one derived from the hypothetical
questions (Trust I) exhibits the lowest rates. The fourth region is the only exception,
where the third type has a lower rate. According to Trust I, the highest rates of
trust are found in the fourth region, followed by the sixth and second regions.
Using Trust II, the highest rate is in the third region, followed by the first. The
ranking of the regions is also different when using Trust III, which shows the fifth
Trust Indicator Trust "Rate"
(% of respondents answering in the affirmative)
I 33.1
II 66.8
III 57.78 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
region in first place, followed by the third region. It is important to understand how
these different “types” of trust affect social participation by individuals. Without
this type of analysis, it is virtually impossible to make any sort of recommendation
about how to measure interpersonal trust. Furthermore, in order to have an informed
policy discussion about how trust can be enhanced in Argentina, we need to know
not only what is the desirable trust question, but also what are the determinants of
an individual’s decision to trust others.
C. Social participation in Argentina
Survey respondents were asked to identify the social organizations in which
they participate voluntarily.3  The total participation rate in  Argentina was 19.7%.
A small number of them said that they participate in at least two (2.2%) and an even
smaller portion (0.2%) said that they participate in at least three. International
studies use “membership density” as a measure of social capital, which is calculated
as the average number of groups cited per respondent in each country. The data
collected for this study implies a membership density of 0.21. This number is well
below the corresponding average membership density in Argentina for 1981 and
1990 as estimated by the WVS, which was 0.41. In a sample of 37 developing and
developed countries with WVS data, Argentina’s membership density was the
lowest. The fact that the number estimated with this new survey instrument is
lower should be taken with a grain of salt due to differences in survey design.4  A
recent study by FLACSO (1997) estimated Argentina’s participation rate at 20%.
Thus our current estimate seems reasonable. One point is clear: we have no
evidence showing that Argentina currently is a country with a high level of social
capital, and this new data on social participation is not encouraging. The rest of
the analysis focuses on the primary organization identified by the respondents.
4. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION5
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis of the determinants of social
capital in Argentina, it is important to establish some testable hypotheses. In this
3Labor unions were explicitly excluded from the options set, because membership is usually
mandatory for workers in Argentina. See also footnote 4 below.
4In the GSS and WVS, the question on membership is:  “Now we would like to know something
about the groups or organizations to which individuals belong. Here is a list of various
organizations. Could you tell me whether or not you are a member of each type?”  In contrast,
the Argentina survey asked the respondent to list the groups to which he/she belongs and then
was asked to use a list of 30 types of organizations to describe each one. It is likely that
providing a list of organizations before asking about actual participation would have increased
the reported number of groups in which the respondent participates.
5For alternative theoretical models of social capital formation see Glaeser et al. (2000) and
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section we present a simple model of an individual’s decision to invest time in
accumulating social capital by participating in social organizations, based on
expected costs and benefits. This approach is consistent with the sociological
(Coleman 1990; Portes and Landolt 2000) and the economic literature (DiPasquale
and Glaeser 1998) that emphasize the definitions of social capital linking the ability
of individuals to secure resources through their membership in social networks.
The decision to participate in social groups can be modeled as a dichotomous
outcome. The individual decides whether or not to participate based on the expected
net benefits:
(1) D1 =   if   nb(D)0 ‡ ; D = 0 otherwise.
“nb” stands for the net benefit. D is the decision to participate in social
organizations; it equals one whenever participation in a social organization produ-
ces positive net benefits. In turn, these net benefits can be disaggregated into
utility effects, where some are positive and some are negative as follows:
(2) nb(D)U(SK(D)wT(D)SKSK)0 DdD =--‡ ggg
The first negative term on the right hand side of equation (2) represents the
opportunity cost of participation (wT(D)) g .  It is the product of the wage rate(w)
times the amount of time invested in participating, which is itself a function of the
decision to participate  (T(D)).6  The opportunity cost of time could include
losses related to lost leisure and other foregone activities such as family
responsibilities.
The second negative term represents the loss of social capital that would
be produced by its depreciation, which depends on the expected probability of
migration. This term is necessary because social capital is presumed to be specific
to the community. After an individual moves to another place, his/her social capital
stock depreciates by a given portion of the overall community stock of social
capital (SK). For example, friendships and business connections in one community
might be less useful in another (as in Schiff 1999). Following Glaeser et al. (2000),
the expected depreciation rate  () d reflects the probability of moving to another
community:
(3) dql = g
where q  is the probability of moving to a different community and  l  is the
rate of depreciation of social capital resulting from the move. The last term in (2)
6Please note that parentheses represent functional dependence, while interactions are represented
by   “ g ”.  The only exception to this notation is the parenthesis in equation (3), which denotes
a subtraction between the terms inside the parenthesis.10 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
also includes an interaction between the net change in the individual’s social
capital and the community’s stock of social capital, because the benefits (and
reduced benefits from migration) depend on the interaction of the individual with
a given community. In the model,  SK D could be interpreted as the change in the
level of interpersonal trust, which depends on the decision to participate. Also,
SK is the aggregate level of trust in the community. .7
The first positive term on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents the
increase in utility that would be brought about by the decision to participate,
which produces a change in the stock of social capital  (SK) D belonging to the
representative individual. In turn, this utility function can be dis-aggregated into
two components:
(4) U(SK(D))U(w(SK(D)SK)SK(D)) DDD =+ g
The first component (w(SK(D)SK)) D g is an expression linking the wage
rate of the individual to his/her change in social capital times the community’s
social capital. In other words, it is assumed that increases in social capital brought
about by increased social participation can produce increases in productivity.
Collier (1998) proposed this type of productivity-enhancing effect. For the case
of Tanzania, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) identify a variety of channels through
which social capital might raise village incomes, including increased com-
munity effectiveness in monitoring the quality of public services, enhanced
community cooperation, increased innovation diffusion, and other actions that
lead to productivity increases. The second term (SK(D)) D in equation (4) argues
that an individual’s utility can be directly and positively affected by his/her social
capital. For example, individuals could gain utility by forming friendships or any
type of social connection that enhances their social status or wellbeing. Several
authors, such as Robison and Siles (1999) and Schiff (1992), propose this type of
direct utility-enhancing effect. It is impossible to ascertain the magnitude of this
effect. By inserting equation (4) into equation (2) and rearranging terms so that the
direct utility-enhancing effect appears to the right of the inequality, we get:
(5) D = 1 if U(w(SK(D)SK)wT(D)SKSK)U(SK(D) DdDD --‡- gggg ,
D = 0 otherwise.
Since the very last term in equation (5) is unobservable, this model can be
summarized as stating that an individual will participate in social organizations to
accumulate social capital whenever the observable net benefits (those on the left
side of inequality (5)) exceed an unobserved threshold.
7There is some ambiguity in the literature about whether participation is a flow or a stock
variable — see Glaeser et al. (2000). In this model, trust is treated as a stock and participation
leads to a flow or change in interpersonal trust. This reasoning is consistent with Collier (1998)
and Coleman (1990) who see trust as the outcome from social interactions.INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 11
From (5), we can derive testable hypotheses. First, the wage rate appears
with both a positive and a negative influence on the index that determines the
decision to participate. The wage itself depends on the decision to participate and
it is endogenous. This should be taken into account when choosing the estimation
strategy. Second, the prospects of migration (or geographic mobility) seem to
reduce the likelihood that an individual will participate. Third, the productivity-
enhancing effect depends on the interaction of the community’s social capital with
the individual’s net increase in social capital. Factors such as the level of education,
age of the individual and his/her profession may determine the magnitude of this
effect. Moreover, education and age may simultaneously determine the threshold
level of the index. Therefore, in the following empirical analysis we will test these
hypotheses, while also controlling for other factors that may determine the
individual’s decision to participate.
5. EMPIRICAL DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN ARGENTINA
A. Explanatory variables
Based on the theoretical model presented above, and the arguments coming
from the political science literature cited earlier, the empirical analysis should aim
to control for three potential causes of social participation and trust. Determinants
of the individual’s income should be considered, including age, level of education
and (the natural logarithm of) current income of the household. Also, we can
expect non-linear effects from age, education and income on the likelihood that an
individual will participate in social organizations. This is due to the fact that the
wage rate theoretically can have contradicting effects on social capital formation.
Therefore, it is possible that for certain ranges of age, education and current
income the negative effect will predominate over the positive effect. For example,
Glaeser et al. (2000) show theoretically and empirically that age has non-linear
effects on participation density across US jurisdictions, presumably because young
and elderly individuals who are not at their peaks in terms of economic participation
in the labor market tend to have low participation densities. The data summarized
in Figure 1 shows that there might be a non-linear relation between trust and
household income. This hypothesis will be tested econometrically.
The employment status of the head of household may affect his/her decision
to participate as well as the decision to participate by other members of the
household. The reason is that participation may take away time from the job search
and from additional work that other household members might be required to
undertake in order to make-up for the family’s loss of income. Alternatively,
participating in groups where the individual can make professional contacts may
enhance the job search. The analysis will control for the employment status of the
household head.
Education may impact interpersonal trust and social participation through
non-economic channels, because education “may help to create a climate of trust12 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
that is self-reinforcing” (Helliwell and Putnam 1999, 5). The probability of
participation could also be affected by the experience of having been the victim of
a crime. Also, it is likely that victimization may reduce individuals’ willingness to
trust strangers (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). The data for these variables was
collected by the survey.
FIGURE 1
PARTICIPATION RATES BY INCOME DECILES
An alternative concept related to income is household wealth. The difference
is that income, as reported by the survey data, is actually an approximate indicator
of current income flows, while household wealth should reflect the stock of wealth.
The latter can be represented by the ownership of assets and consumer durables.
We used the first principal component of a set of variables to construct an index of
household wealth. The variables included homeownership, the number of rooms
per capita in the dwelling, the number and types of automobiles owned by the
household, plus the ownership of other consumer durables, including personal
computers, refrigerators, etc. In theory, the wealth index should help explain “stock”
indicators of social capital (perhaps trust), while the current income variable should
help explain “flow” indicators of social capital (perhaps participation). The data
summarized in Figure 2 indicates that there could be a linear relation between trust
and wealth. This hypothesis will be tested.
As mentioned earlier, the individual’s wage rate is likely to be endogenous
to the decision to participate, and wealth itself may be determined by the stock of
social capital held by the individual. This could also be true for the employment
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to be presented below use the household’s income per capita and wealth index as
an explanatory variable for the individual’s decision to participate and trust
strangers. For employment, we also use the employment status of the head of
household rather than status of the individual. However, since it is likely that
income is correlated among members of the household, this approach might not
fully control for endogeneity, and therefore some of the results presented below
could have an upward bias in the estimated coefficients of the income and wealth
variables.
FIGURE 2
TRUST RATES BY WEALTH DECILES
Community characteristics that may affect the extent of the benefits of
social participation should also be included as explanatory variables. For example,
Zak and Knack (1998) find that income inequality (as well as ethnic diversity)
reduces trust rates across countries, and Alesina and La Ferrara (1999) find that
community income inequality (and other forms of hetergoneity) are associated
with lower probabilities of participation by individuals. For the case of Argentina,
which has been suffering from double-digit unemployment rates, which in turn
might cause social tension, community-level unemployment rates might be
associated with lower probabilities of social participation and trust at the level of
the individual. To control for these two community characteristics (i.e., income
inequality and unemployment), this study relies on data from Argentina’s statistical
agency (INDEC), which permits the calculation of measures of income inequality
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To control for the probability of geographic migration, we include a
household variable about homeownership that identifies individuals who live in
homes owned by the household. The intuition is that homeownership ties
individuals to their communities by raising the costs of migration. This variable
works quite well with US data (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998). A community-level
variable that might be linked to the probability of migration in Argentina is an
identifier of individuals who live in rural areas. The expected probability of migration
is lower for rural households because most migrants reside in urban centers. These
two variables (homeownership and the identifier of rural communities) were also
collected by the survey.8
B. Estimation strategy
1. Basic models
The model indicates that a Probit model approach might be adequate.
Following Alesina and La Ferrara (1999 and 2000), the estimation strategy can be
represented as:
(6) iccicC Pr(D0|X,H)(XH) Fbg „=+
where subscripts i and c stand for individuals and communities (regions or provinces
in our case), respectively, and F is the standard cumulative normal with mean zero
and variance 1. X represents individual characteristics; H represents community
variables. The latent, unobserved Probit index is a function of X and H. Only the
outcomes of the individual’s decisions (D) to participate and his/her answer to the
trust question are observed.
Section VI presents the econometric results from the Probit models. The
presentation of the basic results is limited to the “marginal effects coefficients,”
which show the effect on the probability that an individual will participate (or trust
non-family members) of a discrete change in a continuous variable or of having a
particular characteristic. The standard errors of the estimated coefficients to be
presented are Huber-White errors, which are adjusted for heteroskedasticity of
unknown form. We also allowed for independence of the error terms across
settlements, but we allowed for dependence or clustering of the error terms within
settlements. This correction of the standard errors of the estimated coefficients is
necessary since settlements were surveyed on different days by different people,
and thus the observations within settlements are likely to be closer to each other
than they are to observations from other settlements.
8Table A1 in the Appendix contains the summary statistics of the explanatory variables for the
whole sample of respondents, for those who are heads of households, and for those who are not
heads of household. The distinction between these two groups is important for the econometric
estimates that use characteristics of the household head as instruments for some explanatory
variables that might be endogenous — see sections 5, 6, and 7.INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 15
The estimation strategy begins with the inclusion of individual and
household characteristics together with regional dummy variables. This “basic”
specification analyzes the impact of the X variables while controlling for unknown
community effects. In turn, the regional dummy variables are replaced with
continuous community variables. This specification explores specific variables
that may drive the community effects.
Section 6, which discusses the basic regressions, also analyzes some sim-
ple correlations between individual participation and the three community-level
indicators of trust. Likewise, after examining the basic determinants of individual
trust (I), which seems to be the more reasonable measure of trust, section 6 also
looks at simple correlations between individual trust and participation in the various
types of organizations as defined earlier (i.e., homogeneity of membership with
two criteria, fund management, decision making, and leadership selection
mechanisms).
2. Complications: simultaneity and endogeneity problems
Section  7 attempts to address two estimation challenges. The first is related
to the possibility that individual participation and trust are simultaneously
determined. This can occur either because they cause each other as argued by
Brehm and Rahn (1997), or because they have some common omitted determinants.
Generally speaking, ignoring this potential correlation between participation and
trust might reduce the efficiency of the estimates, or even produce biased estimates
if these variables are correlated with other included explanatory variables. To exa-
mine the impact of controlling for this correlation, this study estimates a system of
two equations (one for participation and another for trust), while allowing for their
error terms to be correlated. That is, seemingly unrelated (SUR) Probit regressions
are estimated for this purpose. This approach has been used in other areas of
applied economics, such as Hassan (1996), which examines how different planting
choices affect each other in the cultivation of maize in Kenya.
The second complication is the possibility that some of the explanatory
variables in either the participation or the trust regressions are endogenous. In
particular, given the common finding that social capital helps determine household
incomes and wealth, we need to address the possibility that the Probit estimates
might be inconsistent (or biased) due to reverse causality running from participation
(trust) to household income (wealth). To control for the potential endogeneity of
these variables, I employ Newey’s (1987) two-stage maximum likelihood or Probit
estimator designed to control for the endogeneity of continuous explanatory va-
riables. This approach has been used in other areas of applied research by Ribar
(1994) and Norton et al. (1998). Ribar used it to control for the endogeneity
of continuous indicators of teenage fertility as a determinants of the dichotomous
decision variable concerning high school completion. This author finds that
the negative effect of fertility on high school completion are greatly exaggerated
by endogeneity. Norton et al. use this technique to control for the endogeneity
(caused by the selection of peers) of the average peer substance abuse as a16 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
determinant of the likelihood of substance abuse by adolescents, and find that
peer selection did not produce any measurable endogeneity biases. To test directly
for the endogeneity of these variables, I estimate Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) simple
endogeneity test, which examines the statistical significance of the residual of
household income (wealth) from an income function that includes all the exogenous
explanatory variables as determinants of income (wealth). The null hypothesis of
this test is that the income (wealth) residual is not correlated with participation
(trust). Therefore a p-value above 5% of this test indicates that income (wealth) is
not endogenous.
To secure reliable instrumental variables for household income (wealth) I
use the age, age squared, years of education, and years of education squared of
the head of household. Thus the TS-Probit models were estimated with the sample
of individuals who were not heads of household. The alternative specification,
which would use the characteristics of the non-heads as instruments for household
income (or wealth), was not used due to a rather large set of missing observations.9
All econometric models are estimated with data for the respondents for two
reasons. First, the data for non-respondents is likely to be less reliable than the
data for respondents. Second, the trust regressions can only be applied to
respondent data, because the trust questions could not be answered by the
respondent on behalf of other members of the household. The data used in the
regressions was not weighted, because it is unclear what criteria were used by the
surveyors to estimate the proper weights. The following sections discuss the
econometric results.
6. DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL PARTICIPATION: BASIC REGRESSIONS
A. Social participation
Table 2 shows the basic Probit results for the determinants of the probability
that an individual will participate in any social organization. In the second column,
the first panel shows the estimated marginal effects coefficients for the age of the
respondent, age squared, the natural logarithm of the household’s income per
capita, and the logarithm of income per capita squared. The squared terms of both
variables were included to test for the existence of non-linear effects. The results
show that both variables have significant non-linear effects. However, the direction
of the non-linear effects of age and income are different. The probability of
participation is rising initially with age, but at a progressively lower rate, as shown
by the negative and significant coefficient of the squared age variable. The
9The survey asked respondents to describe the characteristics of all members of the household.
The data required to construct the proper instruments are the average age and years of education
of the household members excluded from the sample. It is not clear why household heads were
less willing to provide information about the rest of household members than vice-versa.INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 17
probability of participation is initially declining with income but eventually rises.
The estimated coefficients imply the following marginal effects of age and income














Figures 3 and 4 show the actual marginal coefficients for the whole sample,
sorted by age and income, respectively. In the case of age, over 72% of the sample,
have positive marginal coefficients; only individuals over 53 years of age have
negative marginal coefficients. In the case of income, over 73% of respondents
have positive marginal coefficients; only individuals living in households with
less than a monthly income of $97 per capita have negative marginal coefficients.
Referring back to the theoretical model presented above, in economic terms these
results indicate that for almost three quarters of the population, the marginal benefits
(i.e., the sum of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits) exceed the marginal
opportunity cost of social participation. For the poorest quarter, however, the
marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits of participation.
Individuals who belong to households where the head is unemployed have
a lower probability of participation. The gender variable is significant only in the
first specification and disappears when the wealth index is introduced in the second
specification. The only significant educational variable is the identifier of
respondents who have received their university degree, but this result is only
present in the second model. Some community variables in these models are
significant. Residents of rural communities have a higher probability of participation
than urban dwellers (by about 0.090), perhaps reflecting a lower probability of
migration. Residents of region 1 have lower probabilities of participating than
residents of region 6, which is the control group in both models. In the following
exercises we present additional results that investigate how different community
(or regional) characteristics affect individual probabilities of participation.
10The reported “0.000” estimate for age squared is small but positive (0.0000796). All reported
coefficients are rounded up to the third decimal point. Note that the coefficient on the levels
of age and income are no longer “marginal” coefficients. 18 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
TABLE 2
THE DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN ARGENTINA:
BASIC PROBIT RESULTS
(dependent variable: individual’s probability of participation in any social organization)
(a) Reported coefficients are “marginal” effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect of
a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the
residuals at the settlement level.
(c) The marginal coefficients of age and income are not the ones presented in this table; see
text.
(d) The wealth index is used instead of the natural logarithm of current household income per
capita and homeownership variables.
** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.




Individual - household characteristics: continuous variables
Age of respondent (c) 0.008 ** 0.009 **
(0.002) (0.002)
Age ^2 -0.000 ** -0.000 **
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Income per capita of household) (c) -0.114 ** 0.008 (d)
(0.054) (0.013)
Ln(Income per capita household) ^2 0.012 ** 0.007 (d)
(0.006) (0.008)
Individual - household characteristics: dummy variables
Unemployed head of household -0.078 ** -0.079 **
(0.030) (0.028)
Male respondent -0.025* -0.021
(0.013) (0.014)
Home owned by household -0.008 Not included
(0.022)
Finished primary 0.009 0.007
(education of respondent) (0.035) (0.034)
Finished secondary 0.009 0.009
(education of respondent) (0.038) (0.037)
Finished tertiary 0.062 0.061
(education of respondent) (0.046) (0.045)
University degree 0.081 0.121 **
(education of respondent) (0.064) (0.066)
Community (regional) dummies
Rural 0.089 ** 0.097 **
(0.038) (0.036)
Region 1 -0.097 ** -0.104 **
(0.042) (0.039)
Region 2 -0.035 -0.038
(0.039) (0.035)
Region 3 -0.032 -0.037
(0.058) (0.053)
Region 4 -0.028 -0.033
(0.041) (0.036)
Region 5 -0.054 -0.064
(0.040) (0.036) *
Observations 2235 2187
Pseudo R^2 0.028 0.031
Predicted sample probability 19.1% 19.2%
(Actual = 19.7%) (Actual = 19.9%)INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 19
FIGURE 3
THE MARGINAL EFFECT OF AGE ON PARTICIPATION VARIES
ACROSS THE POPULATION
FIGURE 4
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N=620 or 27.7% of 
sample
N=16145 or 73.3% of 
sample
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In the third column of Table 2, neither the level nor the squared of the
wealth index are significant. These results are consistent with the view that
participation is a “flow” rather than a “stock” indicator of social capital. The only
variable that is not robust to the inclusion of the wealth variables is gender, which
is no longer a significant determinant of participation.
Table 3 presents the Probit regressions that include continuous community
variables. When the provincial unemployment rates and the relative income ratio
of the poorest quintiles are included as explanatory variables, the results concerning
the individual and household characteristics all remain unchanged. The dummy
for rural communities also retains is positive and significant coefficient. The
unemployment rate appears the expected and significant negative coefficient. A
one-percentage increase in the provincial unemployment rate is associated with a
0.008 percent decrease in the probability of individual participation. The provincial
income ratio is not a statistically significant determinant of the probability of
participation.
TABLE 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN ARGENTINA: PROBIT
RESULTS WITH CONTINUOUS EXPLANATORY COMMUNITY V ARIABLES
(dependent variable: individual’s probability of participation in any social organization)
(a) Reported coefficients are “marginal” effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect of
a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors of the underlying Probit coefficients (in parentheses) are corrected for
heterosedasticity and clustering of the errors at the settlement level.
** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 lead to two important conclusions
about the determinants of participation in Argentina. First, most of the robust
determinants of participation are individual or household characteristics. However,
this does not mean that there are no important community-level determinants of
Explanatory variable (a) (b)
Controls for individual-household characteristics? Yes





Provincial unemployment rate -0.008**
(0.004)
Ratio of income shares





Predicted sample probability  (Actual = 19.7%) 19.1%INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 21
participation, since individuals from rural households and those living in provinces
with lower unemployment rates have higher probabilities of participation than the
rest of the sample. Second, only the trust rate based on Trust I seems to be a
reasonable proxy for the stock of social capital. Hence, the survey question used
to construct the trust indicator makes a big difference in terms of estimates of its
effect on participation. Therefore, the regressions presented in the following
sections on trust use Trust I as the dependent variable.
B. Determinants of trust
Table 4 shows the basic Probit results for the determinants of the probability
that a respondent will answer yes to the Trust I question.11  Only one of the
individual or household characteristics under the second column is slightly
significant. That is, the age of the respondent is negative and is significant at the
10% level. Regarding the community dummy variables, the identifier of rural
communities is not significant, and none of the regional dummies are significant.
The third column shows the results with the specification that replaces the
income and homeownership variables with the corresponding wealth indicators.
The level of wealth is significant at the 5% level, but its squared term is not
significant. However, this linear relationship could be biased due to reverse
causality; wealth could be driven by trust. This issue is examined later in this
paper. The other significant determinant of trust in this specification is the gender
of the respondent; males seem to be more likely to respond in the affirmative than
females. Also, one of the region dummies appears significant in this model.
Table 5 shows the results for the model where the regional dummies are
replaced with the continuous provincial variables. This model includes wealth
instead of income because regressions with the common sample showed that
income was not significant. The regression includes the unemployment rate and
the relative income ratio. Both provincial or community variables are significant
and appear with the expected signs. A one percentage point increase in the provin-
cial unemployment rate (above the sample mean) is associated with a 0.024 decline
in the probability of trust by the respondent. The estimated coefficient on the
poor’s relative income ratio implies that a one percentage point increase in the
relative income of the poor in the province of residence is associated with a 0.046
increase in the probability of trust by the respondent. The estimations discussed
so far may suffer from inefficiencies and biases caused by the simultaneity and
endogeneity problems discussed above. The following sections analyze results
derived from estimations that attempt to control for these potential pitfalls.
11Probit regressions with Trust II as the dependent variables produced similar results. The main
exception is the result concerning the crime victimization variable. In this case, the results
have the same sign, but it is statistically significant in the models that explain the probability
of Trust II.22 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
TABLE 4
THE DETERMINANTS OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN ARGENTINA:
BASIC PROBIT RESULTS
(dependent variable: individual’s probability of answering yes to the Trust I question)
a) Reported coefficients are “marginal” effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect of
a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors of the underlying Probit coefficients (in parentheses) are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the settlement level.
(c) The marginal coefficients of age and income are not the ones presented in this table; see
text.
(d) The wealth index is used instead of the natural logarithm of the household income per capita
and homeownership variables.
** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.






Individual - household characteristics: continuous variables
Age of respondent (c) -0.004 * -0.004 *
(0.002) (0.002)
Age ^2 0.000 0.000 *
(0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Income per capita of household) (c) 0.128 0.038 **
(0.099) (0.016) (d)
Ln(Income per capita household) ^2 -0.006 -0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (d)
Individual - household characteristics: dummy variables



































































Pseudo R^2 0.042 0.034
Predicted sample probability 32.4% 32.3%
(Actual = 33.1%) (Actual = 32.9%)INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 23
TABLE 5
THE DETERMINANTS OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN ARGENTINA: PROBIT
RESULTS WITH CONTINUOUS EXPLANATORY COMMUNITY V ARIABLES
(dependent variable: individual’s probability of answering yes to the Trust I question)
(a) Reported coefficients are “marginal” effects. For dummy variables, they show the effect
of a change from 0 to 1.
(b) Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the
residuals at the settlement level.
** = significant at 5% level; * = significant at 10% level.
7. CONTROLLING FOR SIMULTANEITY AND ENDOGENEITY: SUR- AND
TS-PROBIT REGRESSIONS
Table 6 presents the results from the SUR Probit regressions, which control
for the potential correlation between the error terms (or residuals) from both models
estimated simultaneously. A first observation is that errors of both models are in
fact correlated.12  This statistic appears at the bottom of Table 6. Second, none of
the signs of the coefficients in either regression are different from those discussed
in reference to Tables 3 and 5. Third, there are a few changes regarding the statistical
significance of some of the explanatory variables. In the participation regression,
the age and household income variables, which were significant in the previous
results, are now even more significant. Also, now the university degree dummy
variable appears with the expected positive sign as it did before, but is now slightly
significant at the 10% confidence level. The provincial unemployment rate is no
longer a significant determinant of participation. For the trust regression, none of
the age variables appear significant at the 10% level (with opposite signs as those
in the participation regression). The absolute value of the Probit coefficients are
virtually identical to those previously estimated (but not presented). Hence it
12This results did not change when using the Trust II variable instead of Trust I.
Explanatory variable (a) (b)
Controls for individual-household characteristics,
including wealth?
Yes




Provincial unemployment rate -0.024**
(0.005)
Provincial ratio of income shares
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seems that there is a significant simultaneity issue affecting these two models, but
the correlation between participation and trust mainly affects the precision or
efficiency of the estimates, rather than their signs.
TABLE 6
SUR PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON PARTICIPATION AND TRUST (I)
(a) Standard errors (in parentheses) corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the
residuals at the settlement level.
(b) The wealth index is used instead of the natural logarithm of the household income per capita
and homeownership variables.
Note: Regression included intercepts for both dependent variables.







Individual - household characteristics: continuous variables




















Individual - household characteristics: dummy variables
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Table 7 presents the results from the TS-Probit models estimated separately.
The income squared and wealth squared variables were omitted due to the
impracticality of estimating models with more than one endogenous variable. Pa-
nel A in Table 7 shows the results from the first-stage regressions where the
dependent variables were the log of household income (for the participation model)
and the household wealth index (for the trust model). The results show that the
instruments worked quite well as determinants of both endogenous variables.
Moreover, additional auxiliary Probit regressions indicated that the chosen instru-
mental variables have no direct effect on the relevant dependent variables, thus
suggesting that any effect they have on social participation and trust go through
their indirect effect via their effects on household income or wealth.13
Panel B shows the results for the participation and trust regressions once
the potentially endogenous variables (household income and wealth, respectively)
are instrumented using the household head’s age and education characteristics as
instruments (as well as all other exogenous variables included in both models). In
both cases, there are strong non-linear effects of age, as previously estimated in
with the regular Probit and SUR Probit regressions. The exogenous component of
household income has a strong positive correlation with the probability of
participation; and wealth has a strong positive effect on the probability of trust.
Residents of rural communities still have a higher probability of participation than
others, and the provincial unemployment rate again appears with a slightly
significant and negative coefficient in the participation model. In contrast, the
probability of trust is still significantly determined by both provincial variables,
the unemployment rate and the relative income of the poor.  The Rivers-Vuong
endogeneity tests indicate that household income was certainly endogenous,
while household wealth is not necessarily endogenous. These conclusions are
supported by the fact that the errors from the first-stage and the second-stage
regressions were significantly correlated only in the models concerning
participation, but not for trust.
13These regressions are available from the author upon request.26 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
TABLE 7
TWO-STAGE PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON PARTICIPATION AND TRUST
(a) Wealth index included in trust regression instead of household income.
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Explanatory Variables Participation Trust (I)
A. First-stage regressions:
Dependent variables are Ln (household income) and household wealth index
Education yrs. of head of household 0.392 ** 0.064 **
Education yrs. of head of household^2 -0.046 ** -0.001 **
Age of head of household 0.016 * 0.376 **
Age of head of household^2 -0.000 -0.046 **
Age of respondent -0.009 -0.009
Age of respondent^2 0.000 ** 0.000
Victim of crime in household Not included 0.088 *
Male respondent 0.169 ** -0.061
Finished primary (respondent) 0.391 ** 0.296 **
Finished secondary (respondent) 0.751 ** 0.730 **
Finished tertiary (respondent) 0.974 ** 1.053 **
University degree (respondent) 1.242 ** 1.283 **
Unemployed head of household -0.611 ** -0.386 **
Home owned by household -0.000 Not included
Rural community -0.188 ** -0.235 **
Provincial unemployment rate 0.024 ** 0.018 *
Provincial ratio of income shares (poorest quintile /
richest quintile)
0.065 ** 0.028
Intercept 2.351 ** -2.983 **
B. Second-stage regressions:
Dependent variables are individual participation and trust (I)
Age of respondent 0.026 ** -0.033 **
Age of respondent^2 -0.000 * 0.000 **
Ln(household income) 0.475 ** 0.358 ** (a)
Victim of crime in household Note included 0.103
Male respondent 0.000 -0.045
Finished primary (respondent) -0.217 -0.133
Finished secondary (respondent) -0.389 -0.094
Finished tertiary (respondent) -0.359 -0.184
University degree (respondent) -0.337 -0.132
Unemployed head of household 0.221 -0.046
Home owned by household -0.103 Not included
Rural community 0.340 ** 0.146
Provincial unemployment rate -0.030 * -0.080 **





Error correlation -0.377 ** -0.194
Rivers-vuong endogeneity test  (p-value) 0.016 ** 0.186INCOME, WEALTH, AND SOCIALIZATION IN ARGENTINA 27
8. CONCLUSIONS
Research on the causes of social capital is in its infancy. This study is one
of the first of its kind. It provides an analysis of individual and community
characteristics that affect individual decisions related to the accumulation of so-
cial capital in a developing country.
This study provided a baseline measurement of indicators of social capital.
Argentina is probably on the lower end of social capital when compared to pre-
existing international evidence. The results presented here are roughly equivalent
to those reported by FLACSO (1997). More importantly, that questions used to
measure social capital determined the validity of the empirical indicators of social
capital. This is particularly important when measuring interpersonal trust. To nail
down this argument, consider the fact that when individuals were asked about
their perceptions about whether community members participate in social
organizations, over 38% answered in the affirmative. This percentage is almost
100% higher than the actual participation rate of 19.7%. Future research on social
capital should rely on survey questions that inquire about actual behavior, rather
than general perceptions derived from ambiguously worded questions.
The main determinants of the probability of participation in Argentina are
age, age squared, household income (and perhaps income squared), rural
communities (perhaps due to lower probabilities of migration among rural residents,
since most migrants live in urban centers), perhaps community or provincial
unemployment rates, and the individual’s trust itself. In contrast, the main
determinants of trust are age and age squared, but with the opposite signs to
those exhibited by probability of participation, household wealth (but not its squared
term nor household income), participation itself (as demonstrated by the SUR
Probit results concerning the cross-correlation between the two social capital
models), and especially the community or provincial unemployment rates and
income inequality. These results are consistent with the predictions of a simple
economic model of the determinants of social capital, where participation is a flow
variable, while trust is a stock variable.
There are many remaining issues that merit further analysis. In this study
we did not focus on the potential effects of family structure on participation and
trust. It is plausible that single parents may have either higher opportunity costs
of participation or higher payoffs, if the participation entails sharing parenting
responsibilities with other members of the community. Our results on gender were
not robust, because its significance depended on whether the specification
included the income or the wealth variables. A look at the correlations between the
gender of the respondent and the household income and wealth variables reveals
that the likelihood that the respondent will be a male is positively correlated with
income, but not with wealth. The lack of robustness of the gender variable may be
related to some form of selection bias. For example, male heads of household are
more likely to be away from home when income flows are important relative to the
stock of wealth. Future research could re-examine the link between gender and
social capital while controlling for this type of selection bias.28 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA Vol. 42 (Mayo) 2005
This study found a very weak link between educational attainment and
social capital. Namely, the results show very weak evidence that university
graduates are more likely to participate than individuals with lower levels of
education. Education is not a robust predictor of interpersonal trust. Yet it is likely
that the connection between education and social capital is more complicated.
Future studies should attempt to fill this gap, perhaps by following Helliwell and
Putnam (1999) by using relative educational indicators that measure where the
individual stands relative to his/her community’s average.
A particularly interesting area for future research is to use the responses to
questions about hypothetical shocks faced by individuals and households. For
instance, the survey included a question about who the respondent would turn to
for assistance when he/she loses her employment or there is a natural catastrophe.
In the case of unemployment, 30.6% of respondents said they would have to rely
on themselves and 34.4% said they could rely on neighbors. Very few identified
either a particular organization (secular or religious) or a government agency. These
data could be used to provide a more colorful picture of why Argentina’s social
participation rates are so low. Future research could look at correlations between
responses to this hypothetical “shock” questions and various individual and
household characteristics.
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TABLE  A1
SUMMARY STATISTICS







Participation in any organization 19.7% 20.7% 18.8%
Interpersonal trust (hypothetical question) 33.1% 36.3% 30.2%
Age of respondent (years) 42.1 48.4 36.4
Household income per capita (dollars per
month)
232.1 257.7 209.2
Unemployed head of household 6.4% 8.9% 4.2%
Male respondents 46.6% 71.4% 24.3%
Finished primary education (respondent) 42.4% 42.9% 43.0%
Finished secondary education (respondent) 23.0% 27.8% 24.2%
Finished tertiary education (respondent) 16.6% 12.5% 20.3%
University degree (respondent) 6.5% 8.7% 4.5%
Homeowners (household) 78.4% 75.2% 81.3%
Rural households 10.7% 11.1% 10.3%
Victim in the household  (last year) 20.5% 18.3% 22.5%